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Abstract—Statistical Disclosure Control is the collective
name for a range of tools used by data providers such
as government departments to protect the confidentiality
of individuals or organizations. When the published ta-
bles contain magnitude data such as turnover or health
statistics, the preferred method is to suppress the values
of certain cells. Assigning a cost to the information lost by
suppressing any given cell creates the “Cell Suppression
Problem”. This consists of finding the minimum cost
solution which meets the confidentiality constraints. Solving
this problem simultaneously for all of the sensitive cells in
a table is NP-hard and not possible for medium to large
sized tables. In this paper, we describe the development of
a heuristic tool for this problem which hybridizes linear
programming (to solve a relaxed version for a single
sensitive cell) with a genetic algorithm (to seek an order
for considering the sensitive cells which minimizes the final
cost). Considering a range of real-world and representative
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“artificial” datasets, we show that the method is able to
provide relatively low cost solutions for far larger tables
than is possible for the optimal approach to tackle. We show
that our genetic approach is able to significantly improve
on the initial solutions provided by existing heuristics for
cell ordering, and outperforms local search. This approach
is then extended and applied to large statistical tables with
over 200,000 cells.
Index Terms—Statistical Disclosure Control.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s “Knowledge Economy” many organisations
hold large amounts of data gathered from a variety of
sources, some of which they wish to publish, sell, or
otherwise exploit and disseminate, whilst respecting the
privacy of individual sources. As for their counterparts
in most countries, the UK’s Office for National Statis-
tics (ONS) has a duty to protect the confidentiality of
“sensitive” data in published tables, achieving this via a
number of approaches collectively known as Statistical
Disclosure Control (SDC) [26]. These approaches either
change the values of the cells in the tables (perturba-
tive) or do not (non-perturbative). Perturbation methods
tend to be less computationally expensive than non-
perturbation methods and therefore can be applied to
larger tables. The methods known as rounding and con-
trolled rounding [9] either lose the additivity of the table
and/or modify the margin totals reducing the usefulness
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of the table to the end user. To reduce this problem
Castro [5] has developed a new minimum-L2-distance
perturbation method which maintains both additivity and
the margin totals and has been shown to protect three-
dimensional tables with up to 1,000,000 cells. The main
non-perturbation method is known as cell suppression
which, when done optimally or near optimally, can
only be applied to smaller tables than the perturbation
methods as it involves solving a difficult combinatorial
optimisation. It is the objective of this paper to extend
cell suppression, which preserves more of the original
cell values than perturbation methods, so that it can be
applied to larger tables. Cell suppression suppresses not
only the values of the sensitive cells in a published
table, but also those of some additional “secondary”
cells. These are chosen to prevent the calculation of the
sensitive cells’ values while keeping information loss to
a minimum. To use an analogy, the problem is similar to
that of creating a Sudoko problem where it is impossible
to assign a value to one or more specified cells. The
equivalent optimization task would be to find a version of
the Sudoko table in which as many cells as possible have
their values published (or can be calculated), while still
meeting the “impossibility” constraint. In practice, an at-
tacker can identify the minimum and maximum possible
values of the suppressed cells by solving two similar
linear programs (LPs) per cell. The table is considered
“protected” if an attacker is unable to estimate the
sensitive cells’ values within specified limits. Fischetti &
Salazar [10],[11] have formulated this “cell-suppression”
problem as a complex Mixed Integer Program (MIP)
and optimally solve it (for small tables) using Benders
decomposition and branch-and-cut with valid inequal-
ities. Integral to their approach is the construction of
approximate bounds via an efficient LP-based heuristic
procedure from [15],[17]. This constructs a solution by
processing a specified sequence of the sensitive cells,
gradually building up a secondary suppression pattern so
as to meet the protection constraints, while minimising
information loss.
This MIP approach has been incorporated into widely
used tools such as τ -Argus [18],[25], along with a
range of existing heuristic approaches. However, the
current tools leave much to be desired. As currently
implemented, the output from the LP heuristic is not
available to the user, and because of the large numbers
of constraints and variables, the “optimal” approach is
only possible for tables with a few hundreds (or at best
very few thousands) of cells. Compared to the size of
tables that ONS and other national statistics agencies
wish to publish, these are tiny. To give an example, an
analysis of industrial activity broken down by region and
activity type might have millions of cells and several
dimensions, each with different levels of hierarchy. For
two-dimensional non-hierarchical tables optimal meth-
ods based on a “network flow” formulation are possible
for larger tables [10] [4], and recently a hybrid genetic
approach has been proposed to extend the scalability
of this approach [1]. However these are not applicable
to multi-dimensional or hierarchical tables. Alternative
heuristic approaches such as the Hypercube method [25]
can be used to protect larger tables, but it is well known
that even on smaller tables they significantly “over-
protect” - causing significantly greater than necessary
information loss [14].
In this paper we describe the development and anal-
ysis of a heuristic method for solving larger tables.
The approach adopted uses a genetic algorithm (GA)
to optimize the sequence in which the sensitive cells
are fed into the linear program (incremental attacker
heuristic) from [11], to build up a suppression pattern.
We compare our approach with several fixed heuristics
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for ordering the sensitive cells, and to the use of local
search methods. We also compare the effects of different
mutation operators (equivalently search neighborhoods)
for the genetic algorithm (respectively local search).
As the decision as to what values to assign to the
parameters that control a GA have a great impact on its
performance we introduce self-adaption of the mutation
operator and probability. The self-adaption of mutation
parameters has been proved successful in the continuous
domain [3] [19] and for binary combinatorial problems
[2] [12] [16], but here we use it for a permutation
problem. The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.
Section II provides a mathematical formulation of the
cell suppression problem and of the linear programs
used to solve the relaxed incremental version. Section III
describes our experimental framework and the data sets
used for this study. Section IV describes the results
from experiments comparing local and genetic algorithm
searches. Section V looks at ways to reduce the cost
of the fitness function. Section VI describes the results
from experiments comparing the performance of the
genetic algorithm with that of the models in τ -Argus.
Section VII considers ways in which the incremental
attacker heuristic can be modified to protect larger sta-
tistical tables. In Section VIII we draw conclusions and
suggest future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. 2.1 A Model of the Cell Suppression Problem
Fischetti & Salazar [[11], p1010] give the following
formal definition of the Cell Suppression Problem (CSP):
A table is a data vector a = [a1, ..., an]
whose entries satisfy a given set of linear
constraints known to a possible attacker,
My = b
lbi ≤ yi ≤ ubi ∀i = 1, ..., n

 (1)
In other words, (1) models the whole a priori
information on the table known to an attacker.
Typically, each equation in (1) corresponds
to a marginal entry, whereas inequalities en-
force the “external bounds” known to the at-
tacker. In the case of k-dimensional tables with
marginals, each equation in (1) is of the type
∑
j∈Qi yj−yi = 0, where index i corresponds
to a marginal entry and index set Qi to the
associated internal table entries. Therefore, in
this case M is a {0,±1} matrix and b = 0.
The attacker can deduce a value yi for cell i, whereas
its actual value is ai. Note that an attacker is assumed to
know the values lbi and ubi of the lower and upper “ex-
ternal bounds”. This may not be a realistic assumption.
They go on to state:
Given a nominal table a, let PS =
{i1, ..., ip} be the set of sensitive cells to be
protected, as identified by the statistical office
according to some criteria. For each sensitive
cell ik(k = 1, ..., p), the statistical office pro-
vides three nonnegative values: LPLk , UPLk ,
and SPLk , the lower protection level, upper
protection level, and sliding protection level,
...
A suppression pattern is a subset of cells
SUP ⊆ {1, ..., n} corresponding to the unpub-
lished cells. A consistent table with respect to a
given suppression pattern SUP and to a given
nominal table a is a vector y = [y1, ..., yn]
satisfying
My = b
lbi ≤ yi ≤ ubi ∀i ∈ SUP
yi = ai ∀i /∈ SUP


(2)
where the latter equations impose that the com-
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ponents of y associated with the published en-
tries coincide with the nominal ones. In other
words, any consistent table gives a feasible
way the attacker can fill the missing entries
of the published table.
A suppression pattern is considered fea-
sible by the statistical office if it guarantees
the required protection intervals against an at-
tacker, in the sense that, for each sensitive cell
ik(k = 1, ..., p) there exist two feasible tables,
say fk and gk, such that: f kik ≤ aik − LPLk ,
gkik ≥ aik +UPLk and gkik − fkik ≥ SPLk .
In fact for the purposes of this research “less/more
than or equal to” inequalities in expressions above are
replaced by “strictly less/more than” inequalities to be
consistent with ONS’ understanding of protection limits.
This is not a trivial distinction given that table data values
and protection limit values tend to be integer and often
small. The result is usually a distinctly larger set of
suppressed cells when the table has many integer values,
i.e. frequency tables and certain magnitude tables.
Knowing the external bounds lbi and ubi for all cells
i = 1, ..., n and which cells have been suppressed in
the published table, an attacker will try to discover the
minimum and maximum possible values, of each cell.
For a given sensitive cell ik, solving an LP to minimize
(maximize) yik subject to constraints (2) provides the
minimum (maximum) possible values f kik (g
k
ik
).
To conform to the ONS understanding of sufficient
protection, we apply a modified version of the standard
model which states that the sensitive cell ik is suffi-
ciently protected if the solutions to these LPs satisfy
min(yik) < LPLk and UPLk < max(yik). It has been
asserted that if this condition is satisfied for all sensitive
cells ik. then the whole table is feasible, i.e., sufficiently
protected [ibid]. However, given that the attacker will
not know which of the suppressed cells are the sensitive
ones, this condition should really be satisfied not just
for each sensitive cell ik, but also for each secondarily
suppressed cell within the set SUP. If not, then the values
of certain secondarily suppressed cells might be guessed,
subverting the protection of the sensitive cell.
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 4 4 4 4 4 20
2 4 4 4 4 4 20
3 4 4 121 4 4 137
4 4 4 4 4 4 20
5 4 4 4 4 4 20
Total 20 20 137 20 20 217
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF AN OPTIMAL SUPPRESSION PATTERN. CELL (3,3) -
DARK SHADED, IS SENSITIVE. SECONDARY SUPPRESSED CELLS
ARE SHOWN IN A LIGHTER SHADE. SUB-OPTIMAL METHODS
WOULD SUPPRESS MORE CELLS OR MORE INFORMATIVE ONES
SUCH AS ROW/COLUMN TOTALS.
B. The Incremental Attacker
Fischetti & Salazar [11] state that their branch-and-
cut (BC) approach finds an optimal set of secondarily
suppressed cells that guarantees protection for all sensi-
tive cells in a table. The approach is sophisticated, time-
consuming and identifies optimal solutions only for mod-
erately sized tables. However, the authors do make use of
a fast heuristic to find incumbent solutions at each node
of the BC tree, based on a heuristic procedure from Kelly
et al. [15] and Robertson [17]. The heuristic starts by
taking as input the set of sensitive cells P = {i1, ..., ip}
and the sequence in which to protect them. The set SUP
of suppressed cells is initially set equal to the set of
sensitive cells. For each sensitive cell in turn, the set SUP
is then augmented by solving two LPs. These use the cell
weights, consistency equations, upper and lower bounds,
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and upper and lower protection limits provided by τ -
Argus to determine what extra cells must be suppressed
to satisfy the protection requirements. These are added to
SUP and the process iterates to protect the next sensitive
cell in the sequence.
The sequence used is heuristically determined accord-
ing to decreasing weight in [11], but our preliminary
experimentation confirmed that even for a table with
only 70 cells, the ordering can make as much as 30%
difference to the total cost. Thus, in our method the
permutation is the key decision, as it defines the solution
space in our Evolutionary Algorithm.
The first LP, known as the UPL incremental attacker
problem, identifies which cells need to be added to the
set SUP so as to guarantee that a given sensitive cell
ik is protected with respect to its upper protection limit
UPLk . For a given ik, the LP is:
minimise
∑n
i=1 ci(y
+
i + y
−
i ) (3)
such that M(y+ − y−) = b (4)
0 ≤ y+i ≤ UBi ∀i = 1, ..., n (5)
0 ≤ y−i ≤ LBi ∀i = 1, ..., n (6)
y−ik = 0 and y
+
ik
= UPLik (7)
where
• yi = ai + y+i − y−i is the attacker’s estimate of the
value of a cell i ∈ {1, ..., n} so that the non-negative
decision variables y+i and y
−
i are respectively the
deviations above and below of yi from the cell value
ai.
• y+ik and y
−
ik
are y+i and y
−
i for a given sensitive cell
ik.
• UBi = ubi − ai ≥ 0 is the relative external upper
bound on y+ik .
• LBi = ai − lbi ≥ 0 is the relative external lower
bound on y−ik .
• The objective function coefficient ci = 0 for all
i ∈ SUP and ci = cell weight wi for all i /∈ SUP .
After solving this LP, the set SUP is augmented with
all cells i /∈ SUP for which y+i + y−i > 0 in the optimal
solution. After setting ci = 0 for the set SUP’s newly
added cells i resulting from this solution, the second
LP similarly identifies which cells need to be added to
SUP so that sensitive cell ik is protected with respect
to its lower protection limit LPLk by replacing the last
constraint line with: y+ik = 0 and y
−
ik
= LPLk. As noted
above, the working definitions of protection used at ONS
are stricter than those used in the formal model, and
experimentation has revealed other subtle problems.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. DataSets
Thirty eight data sets were provided by ONS in the
“.jj” format as output by Tau Argus. Of these four
were real world tables (two non-hierarchical and two
hierarchical.). Another four were hierarchical data tables
from the τ -Argus distribution. The remaining thirty non-
hierarchical magnitude datasets were created with ONS’s
randomised data set generator, a sophisticated tool which
can be tuned to replicate the distribution of values
typically found in different types of tables. There were
5 randomly created instances for each of the following
classes:
B. Algorithms
The algorithms devised and implemented in this pa-
per use different search techniques to find the ‘best’
sequence in which to protect sensitive cells using the
linear programming (incremental attacker) heuristic. The
combination of local search or genetic algorithms with
the linear programming heuristic was first reported in
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Rows Columns % sensitive cells % cells with value 0
200 5 10 25
200 5 2 5
200 50 10 25
200 50 2 5
4000 10 10 25
4000 10 2 5
TABLE II
FACTORS USED TO CREATE THE RANDOMLY GENERATED TABLES.
[23]. Here we expand on those results and present
improvements to two of the major issues cited: the need
for automatic selection of mutation operators, and the
need for a more effective linear programming model.
The hybrid techniques developed are also compared with
existing algorithms. The algorithms were implemented
in the C++ language using the open source COIN-
OR framework - in particular the OSI framework for
defining LP problems and the CLP solver [7]. Initial
experimentation showed that the code ran approximately
five times faster when using a commercial LP solver such
as CPLex [6]. However using the public domain CLP
solver, facilitated the running the experiments in parallel
which more than compensated for its slower speed.
The experiments were designed to determine whether
there was any benefit to the use of a population-based
approach as opposed to a simple local search method.
A second goal was to determine the effect of changing
the way in which solutions are perturbed by mutation (in
the GA) or in the Local Search routine. This was then
extended to see if the selection of the mutation operator
and probability could be left to the GA itself.
In order to explain the results better we begin by
describing the working of the genetic algorithm used:
1) An initial population of potential solutions (i.e.
orderings of the sensitive cells) is created using
the following heuristics:
• Ordered by weight (cost) of the cells as per
[11].
• Using random permutations
2) Each solution in this population is evaluated by
creating the suppression set and counting its total
cost.
3) Two parents are selected by tournament and an off-
spring produced by recombination, then mutation.
4) The new offspring is evaluated and compared to
the member of the population with the highest cost,
replacing it if the offspring’s cost is lower.
5) If the criteria for ending the run has been met, the
process stops, otherwise it returns to step 3.
This framework was explicitly designed to be flexible
and allow the use of different mutation operators to
perturb existing solutions. For Local Search the popula-
tion size is simply set to one. Preliminary work showed
population sizes of fifty to be too large, since on the
bigger tables the time-allowance was used before the
initial population had been evaluated - i.e. before the
processes of simulated evolution had time to create and
select new lower-cost solutions. In the light of this
experience it was necessary to use a smaller population
size. Given the existence of two heuristics (increasing
weight and decreasing weight) for creating solutions with
which to “innoculate” the search (see below), and the
findings in [24] that these should not represent the major
part of the initial population, we used a population size
of ten for the genetic algorithm. Thus the choice of
population size is driven by the desire to solve bigger
tables, where in general it takes longer to solve each LP,
rather than by specific characteristics of any particular
data. Given the small population size, and the use of
heuristics to innoculate the initial population, it was
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important to avoid the risks of premature convergence.
Therefore, rather than using fitness-proportionate selec-
tion, we used rank-based binary tournaments, always
selecting the fittest candidate.
The recombination operator used was Davis’ “Order-
based” crossover, a permutation-specific operator [8].
This was chosen as it was specifically designed to mix
the absolute order in which items (in our case primary
cells) occur on the two parents whilst also preserving that
information that is common to both parents, i.e. that has
been “learnt” by the algorithm. Order-based crossover
copies a segment, between two random crossover points,
from one parent to the offspring. Then starting from the
second crossover point and wrapping around at the end
of the list copies the remaining unused numbers from
the other parent to the offspring. A fixed rate of 0.7 was
taken as standard from the literature.
Three different neighbourhood generation operators
were used for the Local Search/Mutation steps, namely:
• Insertion: pick two random values in the permu-
tation, and move the second to just behind the
first, moving the intermediate elements along to
accommodate the change.
• Swap: swap the position of two randomly chosen
elements.
• Inversion: reverse the order of a randomly selected
sub-string.
These combinations of operators and parameters pro-
duced three local search algorithms (LS-Swap, LS-Insert
and LS-Invert) and three genetic algorithms (GA-Swap,
GA-Insert and GA-Invert), initially using a fixed mu-
tation probability of 1/len where len is the length of
the sequence to be optimised and again this is taken as
standard from the literature.
The fitness cost used by the GA is
∑n
i=1 ziwi where
zi = 1 if cell i is suppressed and 0 if it is not suppressed.
wi is the weighting given to the information loss should
cell i be suppressed. Which cells are suppressed is
determined using the linear programming (incremental
attacker) heuristic which as Equation 3 shows necessarily
works by minimising a partial fraction (y+ and y−
are continuous variables) rather than the full amount
since that would present a non-linear problem. Therefore
the fitness function for the GA is the combination of
the linear programming (incremental attacker) heuristic
followed by the summation of the full cost of every
suppressed cell.
C. Presentation of Results
Initial inspection of the data showed that even for
the same table size, the differences in the values of the
results obtained depended far more on the contents of the
table, (i.e. on the value used to seed the randomised table
creation process) than on the approach taken. Naturally
the size of the table was also a major contributing factor,
since bigger tables with more primary cells almost in-
evitably had higher cost solutions associated with them.
While the analysis of the strength of different effects has
to be treated with caution, a highly significant finding
was that in all cases the result obtained was better than
or equal to that produced by any of the original heuris-
tics. In this light, it was decided to undertake a further
analysis where the results on each table are normalized
relative to the cost of the equivalent order-by-weight
solution. This metric indicates the relative magnitude
of the improvement found over current methods, and
partially alleviates the strength of the table as factor. It is
this metric that is presented for comparison in Table III.
D. Analysis
The results from each run were analysed using the sta-
tistical package SPSS. To see if there was any significant
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difference in the performance of the different algorithms
we used the non-parametric Friedman’s ANOVA test.
This uses rank ordering of the suppression pattern costs
generated by the different algorithms for each of the
statistical tables in turn it is not effected by the different
table properties like size or number of primary cells.
Wilcoxon’s Signed Rank test has been used when a com-
parison of the performance of just two of the algorithms
was required.
IV. COMPARING LOCAL AGAINST GENETIC
ALGORITHM SEARCH
A. Procedure
In this section we compare the performance of local
and genetic algorithm searches when applied to finding
the lowest cost suppression patterns used to protect
statistical tables. For each of the six algorithms (LS-
Swap, LS-Insert, LS-Invert, GA-Swap, GA-Insert and
GA-Invert) five runs were made on each of the thirty
eight tables provided. All runs used the following termi-
nation criteria, stopping whichever occurred first:
• 3 hours of computer time were used up
• 10000 evaluations were used
• 1000 evaluations had passed since the last improve-
ment
• The population mean cost was within 1% of the
best cost for 100 successive iterations (not used for
local search).
For each run we recorded the cost of the best solution
found, the number of evaluations after which it was
found, and the suppression set. The final suppression set
was then fed back in to the maximum and minimum
attacker programs to confirm that it provided adequate
protection for the statistical table. The averaged nor-
malised results are presented in Table III.
B. Analysis
Of the thirty eight statistical tables thirteen were best
(or equally best) protected by GA-Invert, ten by GA-
Swap, seven by GA-Insert, six by LS-Swap, four by LS-
Invert and none by LS-Insert. Thirty of the statistical
tables were best (or equally best) protected by the
genetic algorithms and ten by the local searches, as
shown in Table III. Table IV shows how the Friedman’s
ANOVA test ranked the three local search and three
genetic algorithms for the thirty eight statistical tables.
Further analysis using the Wilcoxon’s Signed Rank test
indicated that with over 99.9% confidence the GA using
the mutation operator Invert (GA-Invert) outperformed
the equivalent local search, that with 99.9% confidence
the GA using the mutation operator Swap (GA-Swap)
outperformed the equivalent local search and that with
97.6% confidence the GA using the mutation operator
Insert (GA-Insert) outperformed the equivalent local
search. The Wilcoxon’s Signed Rank test did not find a
significant difference between the average performances
of GA-Swap, GA-Insert and GA-Invert.
The percentage improvements shown in Table III indi-
cate that the best improvements occurred for the smallest
statistical tables. An analysis of the number of calls to
the fitness function made by the genetic algorithms by
the table size showed, with over 99.9% confidence, that
the number of calls to the fitness function decreases
as the size of the statistical table increases, see Fig. 1.
This clearly shows that when protecting statistical tables
with 40,000 cells that in the three hours allowed for the
genetic algorithms to run they could do little more than
initialise their parent pools. This is because as the table
size grows, so does the time taken in the fitness function,
which involves solving 2 · |P | linear programs to identify
the suppression pattern. For the smaller statistical tables
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we can see that there is a wide range of calls to the
fitness function and this has three possible explanations.
The first is that it is due to the different values and
locations of the primary cells in each of the tables, the
second is that the genetic algorithms are getting stuck
in a local optima, and the third is that it may indicate
early termination due to the population mean cost being
within 99% of the best cost for 100 successive iterations.
Fig. 1. The number of calls to the Fitness Function made by the
Genetic Algorithms by Table Size.
C. Conclusions
The results presented in Table III clearly indicate that
the use of a meta-heuristic search strategy is beneficial.
Solutions to the Cell Suppression Problem are found
with lower information loss than are achieved via the
current “order-by-weight” heuristics. In cases where the
heuristic are able to run for a significant number of
iterations, the suppression pattern cost is reduced on
average by 25.7% of the original cost. As expected,
the results demonstrate that the total numbers of cells,
rows and columns are major factors in determining
the magnitude of the improvements attainable. Since
these factors directly affect the number of constraints
which must be dealt with by the linear programs, they
directly relate to the run-time needed to evaluate the
partial solution for each primary cell. For the same
reasons the proportion of sensitive cells to be protected
is also a factor. Since most runs terminate due to the
time criteria, it is reasonable to expect that a faster
LP implementation would permit greater numbers of
iterations and hence better results. The time allowed is
dictated by the practical constraints of the workplace.
For more subtle reasons, the specific cell contents can
have a major effect. Thus if one respondent is much the
biggest, then the corresponding cell will dominate the
marginal totals in which they participate, and so it may
be necessary to suppress many other cells, regardless of
the order in which the primaries are considered.
As the number of evaluations is limited by time the
size of the initial population was successfully reduced to
ten allowing more time to search the fitness landscape.
This is probably as small as it can go without risking
a serious loss of diversity which could adversely affect
evolvability, especially given that the initial population
is not purely random, but includes results from existing
heuristics.
The analysis of the results presented in Table III
have clearly shown that in this case using a genetic
algorithm outperforms using local search. The analysis
of the number of calls to the fitness function has shown
that the genetic algorithms require longer than the three
hours that they have been given to search the fitness
landscape. To allow this for the larger statistical tables
the time limit is increased in all later tests, and the
termination criteria that the population mean cost being
within 1% of the best cost for 100 successive iterations
is removed.
On individual statistical tables there are significant
differences between fixed operator combinations. In [21]
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we showed that similar behavior was shown for the Trav-
eling Salesman Problem (TSP) and that self-adaption
avoided the possible pitfalls of choosing the wrong
operator. The use of self-adaption in this case was tested
experimentally and shown to perform at least as well as
the use of fixed operators, the results are not shown to
save space. Therefore all future genetic algorithms in
this paper will use self-adaption to select the mutation
operator and mutation probability, These are encoded
in two extra genes with a 0.1 probability of randomly
changing for each iteration of the genetic algorithm [21].
V. REDUCING THE COST OF THE FITNESS
FUNCTION
A. Procedure
To protect a statistical table using this approach re-
quires that two linear programs are run for each primary
suppressed cell in the statistical table. As the size of
the statistical table that is being protected increases so
does the average number of primary suppressed cells
that need to be protected and therefore the number of
linear programs that need to be run. Simultaneously
the time taken to run each linear program increases.
The combination of these two affects the size of the
statistical table that can be protected using a particular
mathematical solver when protecting statistical tables
one cell at a time. We have found that using the CLP
solver to implement this LP restricts us to protecting
statistical tables with less than or equal to 40,000 cells.
In order to allow us to protect larger tables the LP has
been modified to reduce the number of linear programs
that are required to be run. The following modifications
to the LP have been made to allow it to protect larger
statistical tables.
• A preprocessing optimization is used to identify a
subset of the primary suppressed cells (P ) called
the candidate initially exposed primary suppressed
cells (K). The LP has been modified to only protect
members of K as protecting this subset still guar-
antees to protect all of the primary suppressed cells
in the statistical table [20].
• Protecting the primary suppressed cells in groups as
opposed to individually also decreases the number
of linear programs that are required to be run.
Therefore a further modification to the LP has been
made to protect primary suppressed cells in groups.
The performance of these modifications to the LP
were compared by using them to protect the thirty
eight statistical tables described in Section III-A. Three
algorithms were compared, all were self-adaptive GAs
that invoked the LP as their fitness function. These
algorithms were allowed to run for up to twelve hours.
The algorithms protect all primary cells (P ) one at a time
(GA-one-P), protect candidate initially exposed primary
suppressed cells (K) one at a time (GA-one-K) and
protect candidate initially exposed primary suppressed
cells (K) in 40 groups (GA-group-K).
B. Analysis
Of the thirty eight tables that were protected twenty
two were best or equally best protected by GA-group-
K, twelve by GA-one-K and seven by GA-one-P. The
Wilcoxon’s Signed Ranks test indicated, with 98.2%
confidence, that on average GA-one-K produced lower
cost suppression patterns than GA-one-P. It also in-
dicated, with 96.8% confidence, that on average GA-
group-K produced lower cost suppression patterns than
GA-one-P. There was no significant difference in the
performance of GA-one-K and GA-group-K.
Of the ten tables with 40,000 cells eight were best
protected by GA-group-K, one by GA-one-K and one
by GA-one-P. When considering only these tables the
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mean rankings given by Friedman’s ANOVA of the cost
(information loss) were 1.22 (GA-group-K), 2.22 (GA-
one-K) and 2.56 (GA-one-P). The Wilcoxon’s Signed
Ranks test indicated that on average GA-group-K was
better than GA-one-K (98.7% confidence) and GA-one-
P (99.3% confidence).
Protecting only the candidate initially exposed primary
cells (K) instead of all the primary cells (P) improves the
performance of the self-adaptive GA because
1) only the initially exposed primary cells (I) need
to be protected and I is a subset of the candidate
initially exposed primary cells (K). Protecting all
the primary cells (P) may needlessly run LPs to
protect consequentially exposed primary cells (C)
which may lead to overprotection and they are
guaranteed to be protected anyway if the initially
exposed primary cells (I) are protected.
2) less LPs are needed to be run to find the fitness
of each permutation of cells as K is a subset of
P. Hence finding the fitness of each permutation is
quicker and so in a given time more calls to the
fitness function can be made which in turn leads
to a greater search of the fitness landscape.
For the smaller statistical tables (< 30, 000 cells)
grouping the cells in K prior to protecting them may not
lead to lower cost suppression patterns as it reduces the
number of points on the fitness landscape. However for
the larger statistical tables grouping the cells in K prior
to protecting them is better than protecting them one at
a time as grouping limits the number of LPs required. A
fixed number of groups means a fixed number of LPs to
find the fitness of each permutation. Which again means
more permutations can be examined in a given time (i.e.
more searching of the fitness landscape).
It is the ability to search more of the fitness landscape
that gives grouping the advantage for statistical tables
with more than 30,000 cells. This can be clearly seen
if we plot the suppression pattern cost by the CPU
time required (Fig. 2) and by the number of calls to
the fitness function (Fig. 3) for one of the 40,000 cell
statistical tables. All three algorithms were still actively
searching their fitness landscape when they terminated
after their twelve hour time limit. Fig 2 shows that the
algorithms that protected primary suppressed cells one at
a time were only able to find one better solution in the
time given whereas the algorithm that protected primary
suppressed cells in groups found many better solutions.
Fig. 3 shows why this is the case. The algorithms that
Fig. 2. The Suppression Pattern Cost by CPU Time (seconds) for the
three algorithms.
protected primary suppressed cells one at a time made
less than 150 calls to the fitness function in the allotted
time whereas the algorithm that protected primary sup-
pressed cells in groups made approximately 2000 calls
to the fitness function in the allotted time.
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Fig. 3. The Suppression Pattern Cost by the number of calls to the
Fitness Function for the three algorithms.
C. Conclusions
The grouping of candidate primary suppressed cells
prior to protecting them significantly reduces the time
taken to execute the fitness function. This in turn al-
lows the genetic algorithm to better search it’s fitness
landscape which in turn, on average, leads to lower cost
suppression patterns. This has been found to be true for
statistical tables with more than 30,000 cells.
VI. COMPARING THE GENETIC ALGORITHM
SEARCH AGAINST OTHER ALGORITHMS
A. Procedure
In this section we compare the performance of GA-
group-K against that of the existing methods provided
by the statistical disclosure control tool, τ -Argus. The
version of τ -Argus used, for this comparison, was 3.2.0
build 6 (2004). This is the version of τ -Argus that
was available at ONS, where there was a compatible
mathematical solver, when the comparison was carried
out. Later versions of τ -Argus have various improve-
ments but these have not affected the cell suppression
heuristics [13]. τ -Argus was used to protect the thirty
non-hierarchical magnitude statistical tables that were
created using the randomised data generator as the
microdata files, required by τ -Argus for input, were
not available to us for the other eight statistical tables.
τ -Argus provides the algorithms Hypercube, Modular,
Network, Optimal and Marginal for cell suppression.
Each of these algorithms was used to protect the thirty
statistical tables. As the Network algorithm failed to pro-
tect any of the statistical tables it has not been included
in the results table. GA-group-K was allowed up to 12
hours to execute, Modular and Optimal algorithms took
between 5 minutes and 24 hours to execute. Hypercube
and Marginal took less than 5 minutes to execute. The
costs (information loss) of suppressing the secondary
cells are presented in Table V.
B. Analysis
The number of statistical tables protected by each
algorithm, by table size, is shown in Table VI. This
shows that the only algorithms to protect all thirty
statistical tables were the GA-group-K and Marginal.
However Marginal is the method of last resort as it works
by suppressing margin (row and column) totals and this
removes a much larger amount of information from
the table than would suppressing non-totals. Hypercube
protected all of the 200x5 statistical tables, but failed
to protect the 200x50 and 4000x10 statistical tables.
The Hypercube algorithm can theoretically handle much
larger statistical tables than 200x5 and the limitation
here is put down to this being an early implementation
of the algorithm. Modular protected 60% of the 200x5
and 200x50 statistical tables but none of the 4000x10
statistical tables. This is expected as Modular partitions
statistical tables prior to using the Optimal algorithm
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to protect them. The Optimal algorithm should find the
optimal suppression pattern as it is an implementation of
the Fischetti & Salazar [10],[11] Mixed Integer Program
(MIP), however this is limited in the size of statistical
table that can be protected as the optimal solution is NP-
hard to find. Unfortunately the Network algorithm failed
to protect any of the thirty statistical tables. The Network
algorithm is however limited to finding suppression
patterns for two-dimensional statistical tables only.
Of the thirty tables used in this comparison twenty one
were best protected by GA-group-K, eight by Modular
and one by Optimal. Of the twenty tables with less than
or equal to 10,000 cells eleven were best protected by
GA-group-K, eight by Modular and one by Optimal. The
difference between the costs obtained by GA-group-K
and Modular was not statistically significant. For the ten
statistical tables that were protected by both Hypercube
and GA-group-K, GA-group-K produced lower cost sup-
pression patterns for all ten tables. For the ten statis-
tical tables that were protected by both Marginal and
Hypercube, Hypercube produced lower cost suppression
patterns for all ten tables.
There are two anomalies in Table V where unexpected
suppression pattern costs were reported. The reason for
these anomalies is most likely due to the mathematical
solver being pushed beyond it’s working bounds. For
three of the 200x50 statistical tables the Modular al-
gorithm performed very well with secondary cell costs
of 393.0, 790.0 and 419.0. The reason for this is that
no matter what permutation of the primary suppressed
cells is used the LP model sometimes produces relatively
poor results when compared with algorithms that protect
all the primary suppressed cells at once. Solving this
problem is ongoing work.
C. Conclusions
GA-group-K has shown itself to be a reliable tech-
nique for protecting statistical tables when compared
against current ‘state of the art techniques’. In all cases
it produced lower cost suppression patterns than the
Hypercube and Marginal algorithms. Although it only
produced lower cost suppression patterns than the Modu-
lar algorithm for three out of the twelve statistical tables,
the later cannot protect the larger statistical tables and
was only able to protected 60% of the smaller statistical
tables. This indicates that in the future the GA-group-
K algorithm will have an important role to play in the
protection of published statistical tables.
VII. PROTECTING LARGER STATISTICAL
TABLES
A. Procedure
We have seen that for larger statistical tables the lower
cost suppression patterns are achieved by protecting can-
didate initially exposed primary suppressed cells (K) in
groups. Unfortunately this approach can not be directly
applied to larger statistical tables. The problem lies with
the preprocessing stage that identifies the members of K .
Part of this preprocessing stage requires the running of
two linear programs for each of the primary suppressed
cells. To get around this problem a different subset of
primary suppressed cells that we call Ku are used, where
Ku ⊆ K , these are the candidate initially exposed
primary suppressed cells that can be identified using an
unpicking algorithm. As an unpicking algorithm does
not require the use of a mathematical solver it can
handle large statistical tables: for example it took only
42 seconds to unpick a one million cell statistical table.
Tests on a large variety of statistical tables showed that in
approximately 99% of cases K = Ku. In the cases where
K was larger than Ku it was so by, on average, only one
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or two primary cells. Therefore the self-adaptive GA part
of the algorithm uses a surrogate fitness function which
is the linear programming model modified to protect
members of Ku in groups. Once the ‘best’ permutation
of the groups has been identified (i.e. after running the
GA) they are again protected followed by protecting an
extra group comprising the subset P \Ku. This final step
ensures that all primary suppressed cells are protected,
for this the maximum number of iterations allowed for
each LP was increased to ensure the full protection of
each of the statistical tables. This approach was tested
on fourteen artificial three-dimensional statistical tables
of varying size and was shown to have successfully
protected them. In order to make the tables as realistic
as possible a Poisson distribution was used to assign the
number of contributors to each table cell and −1/ log r
was used to generate each contributor’s contribution,
where r is a random number [0..1]. Other factors like
the proportion of zero valued cell and primary cells
were randomly assigned. Six of the statistical tables were
hierarchical. The size and dimensions of the statistical
tables is given in Table VII. The algorithm was allowed
to run for up to 24 hours for each statistical table being
protected and the number of groups was reduced to 20.
The algorithm successfully protected all fourteen sta-
tistical tables. However even though the number of
groups was reduced to 20 and it was allowed to run for
up to 24 hours it was only able to make a limited number
of calls to the fitness function which in turn limited
the improvement that it could make to the suppression
patterns, see Table VIII.
B. Analysis
The limited number of calls to the fitness function
is because as the table has grown in size each fitness
function call has taken longer to execute. The results
shown in Table VIII however are hard to interpret. The
relationship between the table size and the number of
calls to the fitness function was not statistically signifi-
cant. As the number of calls to the fitness function was
limited the algorithm was unable to search the fitness
landscape thoroughly. This lead to only seven out of
the fourteen statistical tables having their suppression
patterns improved. The best improvement from the sur-
rogate fitness function being 15.12%, see Table VIII. It
is reasonable to expect that more improvements would
have been seen given either more time or computational
power.
C. Conclusions
The introduction of a surrogate fitness function has
allowed the algorithm to successfully protect three-
dimensional non-hierarchical statistical tables with up
to 209,300 cells and three-dimensional hierarchical sta-
tistical tables with up to 142,200 cells using the CLP
mathematical solver from the open source COIN-OR
framework. Although this a very good achievement in the
field of cell suppression in statistical disclosure control
the algorithm is still not able to effectively search it’s
fitness landscape, for these very large statistical tables.
This implies that further improvements to the algorithm
should be obtained by simply speeding up each call to
the fitness function and this can be easily achieved by
using a more powerful commercial mathematical solver.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED
FUTURE WORK
The use of a heuristic algorithm that combines a
genetic algorithm and linear program has been shown
to successfully protect large statistical tables. This al-
gorithm was shown to outperform the combination of
local search and linear programing. This algorithm has
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been shown to perform consistently on a variety of
statistical tables of differing sizes. It has been shown
to better protect larger tables than all the algorithms
it was compared with in this study. The use of a
surrogate fitness function has allowed the algorithm to
protect statistical tables with over 200,000 cells. In this
paper this algorithm has only been used to protect two
and three-dimensional hierarchical and non-hierarchical
statistical tables, however it can also protect statistical
tables with more than 3 dimensions.
Future work to improve this algorithm will need to
address the large amount of time that is required to
execute the fitness function as this limits the ability of
the algorithm to search it’s fitness landscape. Further
improvement in the cost of the suppression patterns
found using this algorithm may come from using a
different grouping strategy. Currently grouping is done
by the cell weighting but the addition of grouping by row
and column would add new, previously unseen, points on
the fitness landscape.
The datasets used in this paper will be made avail-
able for download from http://www.cems.uwe.ac.uk/
∼jsmith/Statistical Disclosure Control.html.
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Table Type LS LS LS GA GA GA
Swap Insert Invert Swap Insert Invert
200x5 9.66 8.60 9.89 10.27 10.47 8.51
sens=0.02 6.33 2.88 3.85 5.78 4.81 3.04
zeros=0.05 16.31 7.66 17.25 22.08 20.09 20.58
24.12 18.15 25.34 25.68 25.35 25.46
1.02 0.76 0.58 0.69 0.85 0.74
200x5 13.66 14.63 15.57 12.88 13.84 17.03
sens=0.10 1.86 1.67 1.10 1.24 1.25 1.21
zeros=0.25 17.54 17.13 14.25 14.91 10.30 16.71
6.77 7.94 8.00 9.35 21.86 17.59
13.72 12.21 11.42 15.40 12.32 14.54
200x50 1.96 1.87 7.40 8.95 6.50 5.69
sens=0.02 2.77 2.21 2.58 7.77 8.48 9.27
zeros=0.05 3.54 1.99 8.70 7.39 9.25 6.45
6.22 1.80 12.36 13.72 13.36 13.21
3.03 4.28 3.71 5.59 5.19 2.11
200x50 1.10 0.94 2.12 1.37 0.19 2.40
sens=0.10 6.24 0.13 9.41 10.33 9.28 14.10
zeros=0.25 3.12 2.96 0.75 10.62 11.51 15.12
4.41 1.41 11.24 10.52 9.96 12.78
3.29 1.79 5.96 2.66 0.75 1.61
14x654 1.35 0.00 1.08 1.26 1.43 2.46
sens=0.186
zeros=0.16
14x654 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.84 0.20
sens=0.19
zeros=0.16
712x10 0.59 0.62 0.72 0.71 0.62 0.72
sens=0.06
zeros=0.49
712x10 0.27 0.46 0.94 1.18 1.05 1.17
sens=0.08
zeros=0.49
712x19 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.17 0.91 1.66
sens=0.11
zeros=0.35
712x19 0.07 0.07 0.52 1.10 1.00 1.31
sens=0.13
zeros=0.35
14x1433 0.00 0.15 1.17 1.35 3.10 1.16
sens=0.16 3.65 1.73 3.11 4.38 4.66 6.33
zeros=0.14
4000x10 0.82 0.65 0.43 0.18 0.25 0.25
sens=0.02 1.22 0.61 1.60 2.20 2.34 2.30
zeros=0.05 0.59 1.05 0.66 1.21 1.16 1.16
0.86 0.78 1.10 0.94 1.01 1.14
0.35 0.00 0.28 0.11 0.16 0.31
4000x10 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.41 0.33 0.24
sens=0.10 0.79 0.52 1.03 1.02 0.81 0.60
zeros=0.25 0.69 0.66 0.72 0.72 0.90 0.60
0.38 0.39 0.41 0.52 0.39 0.47
0.14 0.31 0.61 0.57 0.58 0.61
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Performance Algorithm Mean Rank
Best GA Invert 4.33
GA Swap 4.25
GA Insert 4.11
LS Invert 3.47
LS Swap 2.83
Worse LS Insert 2.01
TABLE IV
THE FRIEDMAN’S ANOVA RANKING OF THE AVERAGE
PERCENTAGE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SUPPRESSION PATTERN COSTS
FOR THE SIX ALGORITHMS FOR SIX OF THE STATISTICAL TABLES
Table Type GA- Hyper Mod Opt Marg
group-K cube ular imal inal
200x5 1199 2377 999 997 39580
sens=0.02 232 951 227 - 22560
zeros=0.05 1276 1608 - - 33639
1686 3131 1287 - 20545
1775 3299 - - 37165
200x5 550 2535 - - 18616
sens=0.10 853 1696 597 - 23753
zeros=0.25 285 1316 64 - 39550
254 1368 - - 21273
1193 1199 850 - 20417
200x50 2955 - - - 54280
sens=0.02 2939 - 86984∗ - 54923
zeros=0.05 2228 - 393∗ 2169 55769
3436 - 790 - 56712
2089 - 418 - 56778
200x50 2820 - - - 54566
sens=0.10 2161 - 2189 - 36891
zeros=0.25 1970 - 2522 - 54525
2532 - - - 56895
2352 - - - 36956
4000x10 2730 - - - 8033
sens=0.02 2908 - - - 8542
zeros=0.05 2838 - - - 8433
2605 - - - 8292
2572 - - - 8343
4000x10 2371 - - - 8411
sens=0.10 2715 - - - 8704
zeros=0.25 2646 - - - 8620
2432 - - - 9039
2436 - - - 8643
TABLE V
THE COST OF SUPPRESSING THE SECONDARY CELLS FOR 30 OF
THE STATISTICAL TABLES USING DIFFERENT ALGORITHMS. -
INDICATES THAT THE ALGORITHM FAILED TO PROTECT THE
STATISTICAL TABLE. ∗ INDICATES AN ANOMALY IN THE RESULTS
PROVIDED BY τ -ARGUS. THE LOWEST COST OF SUPPRESSING THE
SECONDARY CELLS HAVE BEEN HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD.
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Table Size
Algorithm 200x5 200x50 4000x10
GA-Group-K 10 10 10
Hypercube 10 0 0
Modular 6 6 0
Network 0 0 0
Optimal 1 1 0
Marginal 10 10 10
TABLE VI
THE NUMBER OF STATISTICAL TABLES PROTECTED BY EACH
ALGORITHM BY TABLE SIZE
Dimensions Number of Number of Size of
(including margin totals) Cells Primary Cells Ku
100 × 27 × 18 48,600 14,807 263
sens=0.30, zeros=0.49
100 × 21 × 24 50,400 10,555 645
sens=0.21, zeros=0.12
100 × 5 × 106(H) 53,000 8,763 5,558
sens=0.17, zeros=0.41
100 × 112(H) × 4 56,000 4,544 4,047
sens=0.08, zeros=0.54
100 × 7 × 83 58,100 11,517 4,430
sens=0.20, zeros=0.43
100 × 20 × 31 62,000 13,164 678
sens=0.21, zeros=0.13
100 × 6 × 112(H) 67,200 1,972 1,933
sens=0.03, zeros=0.51
100 × 20 × 36 72,000 15,422 734
sens=0.21, zeros=0.13
100 × 76 × 10 76,000 13,429 3,629
sens=0.18, zeros=0.26
100 × 4 × 212(H) 84,800 10,265 8,859
sens=0.21, zeros=0.46
100 × 11 × 90(H) 99,000 18,978 10,069
sens=0.19, zeros=0.47
50 × 50 × 40 100,000 21,850 259
sens=0.22, zeros=0.13
100 × 158(H) × 9 142,200 28,032 14,172
sens=0.20, zeros=0.50
100 × 91 × 23 209,300 16,008 3,441
sens=0.08, zeros=0.36
TABLE VII
THE FOURTEEN LARGE STATISTICAL TABLES. (H) INDICATES THAT
THE DIMENSION IS HIERARCHICAL.
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Dimensions Number of Number of Percentage
(including margin Cells Fitness Improvement
totals) Function Calls Surrogate
100 × 27 × 18 48,600 35 15.12
100 × 21 × 24 50,400 30 0.0
100 × 5 × 106(H) 53,000 40 0.0159
100 × 112(H) × 4 56,000 60 10.79
100 × 7 × 83 58,100 35 10.5
100 × 20 × 31 62,000 25 0.0
100 × 6 × 112(H) 67,200 25 2.46
100 × 20 × 36 72,000 20 0.0
100 × 76 × 10 76,000 20 0.0
100 × 4 × 212(H) 84,800 40 0.0
100 × 11 × 90(H) 99,000 25 0.36
50 × 50 × 40 100,000 15 0.0
100 × 158(H) × 9 142,200 20 0.0
100 × 91 × 23 209,300 195 0.15
TABLE VIII
THE NUMBER OF CALLS MADE TO THE FITNESS FUNCTION AND
THE PERCENTAGE IMPROVEMENT IN THE SUPPRESSION PATTERN
COST, BY THE GA, FOR THE FOURTEEN LARGE STATISTICAL
TABLES. (H) INDICATES THAT THE DIMENSION IS HIERARCHICAL.
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